Going after the Cup, and buying “rental” players for a run, is about odds. There’s no such thing as a sure Cup win, despite the many commentators already willing to award the Cup to the Penguins twelve games before the playoffs even start. You never know when the best player in the world might accidentally get a puck to the face, and that is but one of the myriad of ways fortune and unexpected events can affect the results. The playoffs are too much of a crapshoot, and even if at the start of the playoffs the best team in the league has the best odds to win the Cup, even it will always be a significant underdog against the rest of the field combined. All one can have at the trade deadline is a chance, and the chance will never be anywhere close to even 50%. What the GM needs to do is evaluate what the odds of his team of winning the Cup are; how much a rental player improve those odds; and whether the cost is worth the increase in odds. Like most GM decisions, buying rentals is a gamble, and it’s a gamble with better odds of failure than success. But the odds are almost always against any team winning the Cup, right up until the Cup finals begin. The job of a hockey general manager is making bets, and what makes a good general manager is the ability to make good bets based on where there teams are and what their odds are.

Which brings us to the Habs. Everything from the overall record to the underlying numbers, suggests a team with a real chance to contend for the Cup. At the time of this writing, behindthenet.ca places the Habs second only to the Kings in “Fenwick tied” — a metric that measures 5-on-5 shot and miss attempts for and against when the score is tied, and correlates closely with scoring chances. Other metrics similarly place the Habs in the same class as the Boston Bruins and the Pittsburgh Penguins; while they’ve benefitted from good fortune, the Habs’ strong play warrants their position near the top of the standings. The Habs are not a Cup favorite per se, but they are nonetheless part of a handful of teams with better odds than the rest.

This is the situation Bergevin finds his team in. He is on record as being unwilling to mortgage the club’s future, and with the team’s roster as young as it is, and prospects such as Tinordi and Beaulieu not looking out of place as they take their first steps in the NHL, his is a wise policy. At the same time, the Habs are one of the very best clubs in the league, and there is no guarantee that the club will do as well in the following years though, thanks to the club’s overall youth and Timmins’ excellent work, such a thing is certainly possible. Nevertheless, the Habs have a shot right now, this year, and unexpected though it may be, these shots don’t come every year; there’s a strong case to be made for the Habs to “go for it”. Just not at any price.

This is the dilemma facing Marc Bergevin as the trade deadline approaches; his club might be good enough for a run now, but he does not want to mortgage runs that will come in the near future. At the same time, he faces another problem: it may not be all that easy to improve the Habs. This isn’t because the team is too good, but rather it’s a function of how the team is built. A top heavy club like Pittsburgh, and to a lesser degree Boston, carried by their stars such as Crosby, Malkin or Chara, can be improved by adding middling to good players who will replace the team’s lesser lights. Meanwhile, the Habs are built in depth. Their strength is not so much in their stars (though they have them, and PK Subban certainly looks like a Norris candidate, which shouldn’t surprise anyone) as it is that they have strength throughout the lineup, with no real holes to speak of.

Were the Habs healthy, their lineup would look something like this:

Ryder-Plekanec-Gionta

Pacioretty-Desharnais-Gallagher

Bourque-Eller-Galchenyuk

Prust-Halpern-Armstrong

(Moen, White)

Gorges-Subban

Markov-Emelin

Bouillon-Diaz

(Kaberle, Weber)

If Bergevin were to acquire a rental, where would he want to upgrade? For example, if he were to acquire Ryane Clowe, one oft-bandied name, where would he fit? He’s likely no better than anyone in the top-9, possibly excepting Galchenyuk, and the Habs are unlikely to want to scratch the developing 19-year-old. Clowe might be an upgrade on the fourth line,  but he does not really fit the fourth line’s defensive role, and the Habs already acquired Jeff Halpern, who fits the role like a glove.

Even Brendan Morrow wouldn’t be much of an upgrade. A player like Iginla obviously would be, but another rental of this caliber may not be available and even if he were, the price is likely to be prohibitive.

Likewise with the defense. Markov-Emelin, the team’s initial first pairing, have been relegated to second-pair duty because of the re-establishment of the Subban-Gorges as one of the elite first pairings in the league. The worst player of the six regular defensemen is Francis Bouillon. An upgrade there probably makes the most sense for the Habs, though it will take a better player than Douglas Murray to do it. And even then, Bouillon was recently extended; it’s doubtful the Habs did so so they could stash him in the pressbox before that extension even comes into force.

The Habs could acquire someone as injury insurance, but if that someone doesn’t improve the healthy lineup, they’d be acquiring a rental to stash them in the pressbox. It doesn’t seem like a wise use of resources. Of course, if Diaz or Bourque are going to be out long-term, replacing them becomes a valid use of rental players. But other than that, finding a rental who can actually upgrade the Habs is harder than it seems.

There is, however, another consideration that should play in the Habs’ trade deadline strategy, one that would keep the future in mind. Assuming an all-but-assured Kaberle amnesty buyout, the Habs will enter the next season with 18 players under contract and about 11 million available in free cap space. The UFA crop would seem to be quite barren this offseason; Mike Ribeiro is currently the highest-scoring UFA-to-be, and current Hab Michael Ryder would be third.  Needless to say, as the third-wealthiest club in the league and coming off such an excellent season as this one, the Habs can unhesitatingly spend to the cap. They are going to have a fair amount of free space and, even assuming they re-sign Ryder, would have a fair chunk of cap space to add a signfiicant player.

Such a player, however, may not be available on the UFA market. The Habs could take their chances and hope that a desirable player becomes available via amnesty. But could they consider acquiring a player via trade now, or in the offseason, one who would not be a rental but would be a member of the club for next year, and possibly beyond? The Habs would be wise to take care to avoid excessive long-term entanglements with the contracts of three key defensemen, Subban, Emelin and Diaz,  coming up for renewal after next season (Subban in particular is bound to receive a massive raise). But a player whose deal expires after season might be attractive to Montreal in a way that it might not be to cap-strapped contenders. Names such as Ales Hemsky and Marian Gaborik have been bandied about as possibly finding their way on the trade block; though the price for either is likely to be prohibitively high, Montreal certainly ought to at least inquire.

There are a lot of considerations for Bergevin to consider, and there are more options available to him than simply pursuing rentals. Standing pat is certainly not a bad move, and I urge Hab fans not to be disappointed if that is where Bergevin’s strategy takes him. Or he might simply add some depth as insurance for a playoff run. At the same time, Bergevin certainly has the chance to make an impactful move, for this year and for the future. I don’t think, however, that players such as Ryane Clowe are part of the right strategy for the Habs; a rental of this sort would represent only a small improvement (if at all) relative to the assets that such a move is likely to cost.

However, another of the most frequently-suggested differentiations between the Bergevin regime and the years preceding it has been about a purported philosophical difference in handling rookie players. Generally this goes in the form of praising the contributions of rookies Galchenyuk and Gallagher, noting the important roles they play for the team, the trust they get, and then dropping that “such a thing would never have happened under the old regime”. This is puzzling to me, not because keeping Galchenyuk and Gallagher at the NHL is not the right decision (I strongly believe that it is), but because I don’t see much a philosophical difference there.  Neither the Gainey nor the Gauthier administrations were unwilling to trust rookies: the Habs have been blessed with exceptional scouting, and since the lockout the Habs have never been shy to use rookies, sometimes in very important roles. It even got to the point where they were sometimes accused of hampering players’ development by rushing them, notably in the case of Pacioretty (though he does appear to have survived).

I wonder if, because the Gauthier regime was so disliked and so close, there isn’t a tendancy to project imagined flaws into it, and by extension the Gainey regime it is seen as an extension of.

I’ve looked back over the previous years since the lockout and identified the rookies that have played the club on each year. The definition of a “rookie” is as per nhl.com, and the ages listed are calculated at the start of each season.

2005-2006

Rookies playing significant time: Tomas Plekanec (Age 22, 67 gp, 13:15 TOI, 9G, 20A, 29P), Chris Higgins (Age 22, 80 gp, 14:24 TOI, 23G 15A 38P), Alexander Perezhogin (Age 22, 67 gp, 10:07 TOI, 9G 10A 19P)

Other notables: Andrei Kostitsyn (Age 20, 12 gp, 7:32 TOI, 2G 1A 3P), Maxim Lapierre (Age 20, 1 gp, 3:04, 0G 0A 0P)

After the 2004-2005 lockout, the Habs welcomed a trio of promising, 22-year-old rookies to their ranks, all three of which would come to take on important roles throughout the season. Higgins was the most notable as he ended up serving as a first-line wing alongside Saku Koivu. Plekanec was starting to show his two-way brillance and Perezhogin took on an important role on a tough-minutes “checking line”. In the middle of that season, 20-year-old Andrei Kostitsyn got his first cup of coffee with the NHL, and used that time to score on his first NHL shot.

Just as notable as the rookies that did make the team, however, was someone who didn’t. 18-year-old Guillaume Latendresse, the team’s second-round draft pick, was one of the very latest cuts in training camp, narrowly missing being the first 18-year-old since Petr Svoboda to play as a Hab.

2006-2007

Rookies playing significant time: Guillaume Latendresse (Age 19, 12:35 TOI, 16G 13A 29P), Maxim Lapierre (Age 21, 46 gp, 11:25 TOI, 6G 6A 12P), Andrei Kostitsyn (Age 21, 22 GP, 13:17 TOI, 1G 10 A 11P)

Other notables: Mikhail Grabovski (Age 22, 3 GP, 13:18 TOI, 0 G 0A 0P), Jaroslav Halak (Age 21, 16 GP, 16 GS, .906 Sv%)

After just missing the cut last time, 19-year-old Guillaume Latendresse finally makes the team, beating out Andrei Kostitsyn for the last spot. This is significant because Latendresse is still junior-aged: he is ineligible for the AHL, and jumps from the QJMHL right to the NHL. He acquits himself very well with a 16-goal season, being one of the team’s leading 5-on-5 goal-getters; his season includes a stint replacing Higgins on the first line, but for the most part he becomes the anchor of a strong third line, alongside a fellow rookie, the 21-year-old Maxim Lapierre. Another rookie who takes on an important role is Jaroslav Halak, who starts 16 games for the club.

Near the end of the season, 21-year-old Andrei Kostitsyn joins the team and makes an immediate impact; the Higgins-Plekanec-Kostitsyn youngster line provide quite a few highlights for the team.

2007-2008

Rookies playing significant time: Carey Price (Age 20, 41 GP, 40 GS, .920 Sv%), Sergei Kostitsyn (Age 20, 52 gp, 14:21 TOI, 9 G 18 A 27 P), Kyle Chipchura (Age 21, 36 GP, 11:22 TOI, 4G 7A 11P), Ryan O’Byrne (Age 23, 33 GP, 1G 6A 7P), Mikhail Grabovski (Age 23, 24 GP, 11:13 TOI, 3G 6A 9P)

 Other notables: Jaroslav Halak (Age 22, 6 GP, 4 GS, .934 Sv%)

There were a lot of rookies that played that year, but perhaps none better illustrate the Gainey administration’s willingness to trust rookies than Carey Price. The 20-year-old netminder made the team as Cristobal Huet’s backup, but Gainey went so far as to trade the popular Frenchman away and give his conference-leading team’s crease to the rookie Price. 20-year-old Sergei Kostitsyn also played an important role for that team as a secondary scorer. Chipchura and O’Byrne were used in secondary roles. Grabovski, called up after dominating the AHL until the trade deadline, was also a significant contributor, until the off-ice issues that led to his unfortunate trade to Toronto. Jaroslav Halak also becomes the Habs’ backup goaltender after the Huet trade.

2008-2009

Rookies playing significant time: Max Pacioretty (Age 19, 34 GP, 12:37 TOI, 3G 8A 11P), Matt d’Agostini (Age 22, 53 GP, 13:24 TOI, 12 G 9 A 21 P), Gregory Stewart (Age 22, 20 GP, 8:36 TOI, 0 G 1 A 1P)

Other notables: Yanick Weber (Age 19, 3 GP, 15:05 TOI, 0 G 1 A 1 P)

This season sees the debut of Max Pacioretty with the Habs at the age of 19. He plays well, on a defensive tough-minutes line, but his lack of production (much of it due to a low shooting percentage) leads to him eventually being demoted — as a NCAA player, Pacioretty is eligible for the AHL, unlike a typical 19-year-old CHL player. D’Agostini, on the other hand, benefits from favorable percentages on his call-up, leading to an initial goal-scoring spree; his production quiets down after that initial bump, but he remains with the team for the rest of the season, frequently offering his right-hand shot on the PP.

2009-2010

Rookies playing significant time: Tom Pyatt (Age 22, 40 GP, 11:04 TOI, 2G 3A 5P), Ryan White (Age 21, 16 GP, 11:09 TOI, 0G 2A 2P), Ben Maxwell (Age 21, 13 GP, 8:46 TOI, 0G 0A 0P)

Other notables: Pernell-Karl Subban (Age 20, 2 GP, 20:06 TOI, 0G 2A 2P), David Desharnais (Age 23, 6 GP, 8:26 TOI, 0G 1A 1P)

This is certainly a down year for Habs rookies, with only Tom Pyatt, obtained in the Gomez trade, seeing really signficant time. However, this season did see the debut of two players who would become very significant additions in later years: Pernell-Karl Subban and David Desharnais.

In fact, the most important rookie contribution that season comes in the playoffs: Subban is called up to replace the injured Andrei Markov. The 20-year-old plays 20:44 minutes a game for 14 games, scores 8 points on one goal and seven assists, and generally demonstrates that he is going to be a hugely important player for the Habs for years to come.

2010-2011

Rookies playing significant time: Pernell-Karl Subban (Age 21, 77 GP, 22:16 TOI, 14 G 24 A 38 P), Lars Eller (Age 20, 77 GP, 11:08 TOI, 7 G 10 A 17 P), David Desharnais (Age 24, 43 GP, 12:52 TOI, 8 G 14 A 22P), Yannick Weber (41 GP, 16:33 TOI, 1G 10 A 11P), Ryan White (Age 22, 27 GP, 8:55 TOI, 2G 3A 5P)

In terms of rookies playing significant roles, this is PK Subban’s year. The 21-year-old rearguard goes from dominating third-pairing opposition to becoming the team’s #1 D-man over the course of this season, carrying Hal Gill in first-pairing minutes by the time the season is over. This again illustrates the willingness to trust a rookie (and an exuberant one at that) into as important a role as there is on the team.

20-year-old Lars Eller, acquired in trade for Jaroslav Halak, plays the whole season in Montreal, slowly establishing himself as a budding two-way center. Desharnais, who is not so young, establishes himself as an offensive threat this season. Yannick Weber also does well in a third-pairing, PP specialist role.

2011-2012

Rookies playing significant time: Alexei Emelin (Age 25, 67 Gp, 17:17 TOI, 3G 4A 7P), Raphael Diaz (Age 25, 59 GP, 18:00 TOI, 3G 13A 16P), Louis Leblanc (Age 20, 42 GP, 11:11 TOI, 5G 5A 10P), Blake Geoffrion (Age 23, 35 GP, 11:02 TOI, 2G 3A 5P), Aaron Palushaj (Age 22, 38 GP, 7:33 TOI, 1G 4A 5P)

Two rookies are put in a significant role this sesason right from the start, but they’re hardly young — Emelin and Diaz are both 25-year-old veterans of other professional leagues. Still, the rash of injuries forces the Habs to give more minutes than they would like to a number of rookies, notably Leblanc, Geoffrion, and Palushaj — and Frederic St-Denis and Andreas Engqvist play 17 and 12 games respectively on top of that. The Habs trust rookies this year, but not by choice; they’re forced to press unready players into service to fill in the many holes in their lineup caused by injured Habs. Still, Leblanc proves to be a NHL-quality player, despite the setback that would come into the following year.

2012-2013

Rookies playing significant time: Brendan Gallagher (Age 20, 29 GP, 13:34 TOI, 10G 9A 19P), Alex Galchenyuk (Age 18, 33 GP, 12:40 TOI, 3G 12 A 15P)

This brings us to Bergevin’s first year as Habs GM and the two very impressive rookies playing for the Habs. Gallagher is now the regular right-wing on the Habs’ exploitation line, replacing Erik Cole; Galchenyuk serves as a winger on the Habs’ offensive-minded third line, centered by the able Lars Eller. Both play significant minutes and receive well-deserved accolades, but their usage is ultimately not exceptional compared to the slew of excellent rookies the Habs have welcomed since the 2005-2006 season.

Conclusion

The first conclusion from this exercise has to be this: Trevor Timmins is really, really good at his job. This is an impressive slate of rookies the Habs have brought in over the years, and even though several have been dealt to other teams, it still has left the Habs with an impressive core of young players, from Plekanec all the way through Price, Subban and Pacioretty to Gallagher and Galchenyuk. Timmins has had very few very high picks to use, but has managed to draft a huge number of quality NHLers regardless.

Thanks to Timmins’ excellence, between the 2004-2005 lockout and Bergevin’s hiring, the Habs have used several rookies in important roles. Most notable of those were Price and Subban, who were thrust into leading roles during the course of their very first complete seasons. But they also used a pair of 19-year-olds in Latendresse and Pacioretty, giving them significant roles despite both the players being junior-aged.

No, the Gainey-Gauthier administration never put a player as young as Alex Galchenyuk on their rosters. That’s because they didn’t have a third-overall-pick 18-year-old forward to put. This illustrates ultimately why the pre-Bergevin Habs did not give a rookie significant icetime every year: in order to give an important role to a rookie, the team first needs a rookie who has the talent to fill it so early. No sensible organization will put a rookie in an important role unless they believe he has the ability to fill that role, and such rookies simply do not come along every year. When such a rookie  was available (as was the case of Subban and Price), or one they thought would be (Pacioretty, Latendresse) they didn’t hesitate to put him in. And it’s no coincidence that the three players often regarded as the Habs’ “young core” were named in the previous sentence. All three are special players, and so all three warranted the special treatment of receiving vital roles as young rookies.

Bergevin’s first year was fortunate enough to have two such players in Gallagher and Galchenyuk, and this is why Bergevin and Therrien do not hesitate to use them as regular players. Both also benefit from the team’s healthy depth, preventing them from being pressed into service for roles they are not ready to fulfill. But this doesn’t represent a fundamental philosphical change from the previous administration. Rather, it is a continuation of the organization’s willingness to avail itself of the fruits of Timmins’ work.

I’m talking about the Habs.

Last season’s Habs, I mean.

Now, the 2012-2013 Habs are a very strong possession team buoyed by some very good fortune. After their 27th game, they are at 55.5% Fenwick Tied and 53.6% Fenwick Close. These are extremely impressive numbers, but their 1024 PDO, largely on the strength of a 10.1% shooting percentage 5-on-5, which is better than anyone had last year over 82 games. Their goaltending, at .923, is above league average but reasonable. Their 1.40 5-on-5 goal ratio certainly represents playing somewhat above their heads, but there is no doubt that their true talent level is heavily positive.

Nevertheless, luck or not, their possession game at the moment is in Cup-contender territory, which is extremely impressive and speaks well of Michel Therrien’s work as the Habs’ coach. You’ll recall that I expressed some doubt about Therrien’s ability to coach a good puck possession squad, based on the work he’d done with the 07-08 Penguins (a strong special teams club but weak 5-on-5) and the almost immediate turnaround that followed his replacement by Dan Blysma. Well, either Therrien learned a few tricks in-between or the 2007-2008 Penguins’ talent level, outside of its superb centers, was overvalued.

That being said, while some portion of the last-to-first trip of the Canadiens rightfully belongs to its coach, the turnaround is less shocking than it may seem on the surface, because the 2011-2012 Habs entered the season as one of the top 5-on-5 squads in the league.

The Canadiens concluded the 2010-2011 season as a positive puck-possession club; with 51.6% Fenwick Close, they fell just outside the top-10, and their 52.6% Fenwick Tied left them 7th in the league. They did not outscore their opposition 5-on-5, however, due to an run of bad shooting luck; while their .925 five-on-five goaltending was strong, their 7.0% 5-on-5 shooting percentage was second-worst only in the league, leaving them with a PDO of 995.

So when they entered the 2011-2012 season having added another weapon in Erik Cole, there was good reason to believe that their luck would turn and that they would have a good season. And at 5-on-5, their luck did, in fact, turn. They started the year heavily outshooting opponents, despite various injuries to their roster. The Habs’ 5- on-5 game peaked on November 21, 2011, at their 21st game of the season. At the time, their Fenwick Close was 54.6%, their Fenwick Tied was 52.6%, and their 5-on-5 goal ratio was 1.33.

The Habs lost that game 1-0, on a 6-on-5 goal scored on a delayed penalty, despite outshooting the Bruins 33-18 — a loss that was emblematic of their season to date.

Their 5-on-5 PDO had obligingly regressed to more reasonable numbers; they would finish the season at 1001, with 8.7% shooting percentage and .916 goaltending. But the team’s luck failed in three other, vital respects.

First, their power play shooting percentage cratered, so much so that at some points it was not only the worst in the league, it was also worse than 28 teams’ five-on-five shooting percentages. Therefore despite generating as many shots and chances as they had in years prior, the Habs’ PP goal production absolutely cratered, and the optics were made worse by a few high-profile shorthanded goals. The gains they made 5-on-5 were eaten up by their inability to buy a goal with the man-advantadge. Despite their 1.33 goal 5-on-5 ratio at the time, their overall goal- differential was a mere +1 — +3 if empty-netters are omitted.

Second was their inability to convert their goal-differential into wins. A +1 goal differential is no great shakes, but a team that scores as many goals as it allows should expect to win about half their games. Add in a few loser points, and that team can generally end up on the playoff bubble. But after that game the Habs had a 9-9-3 record; they were winning only 3 out of 7 games. This put them in 11th position in the conference standings. This would dog them all year: they would finish the season last in the conference, despite sporting a mere -2 goal-differential once empty-nets had been removed.

Still, they were at most three points out of a playoff spot, and with 55 games remaining, it was certainly reasonable to expect a 52-54% puck-possession club with an exceptional PK and a strong-but-unlucky PP to make up that ground. What killed the Habs was the third bit of bad luck: incessant injuries to important players. At some point, the Habs would simply become unable to cope with the diminution of their roster; they played the vast majority of their early games with an on-ice roster that did not even crack the salary floor. The Habs’s possession game really started plunging after that Boston game, with their tipping-point injury being, quite ironically, the one to Scott Gomez.

The rest is history. Panicked by this nosedive and the team’s inability to win games, Gauthier fired Martin and replaced him with Randy Cunneyworth. The flap over the coach’s inability to speak French got the most press, but it was a red herring. Cunneyworth simply didn’t seem ready for the role, and struggled to identify roles for players he had surprisingly watched for over a third of a season, before finally settling on a deployment scheme that was basically Jacques Martin’s. His simplistic system didn’t help matters. But to be fair, it was unlikely any coach would have done well with the decimated remainder of a roster he had to work with.

But make no mistake: the early 2011-2012 Habs were a good team, displaying strong 5-on-5 ability in their first 21 games. So while there is certainly a large measure of improvement relative to the best work from last season’s squad, it’s not quite the terrible-to-awesome change it’s been heralded as. Bergevin and Therrien have done excellent work with what they have, but what they started with was not quite a hopeless wasteland. There was some real talent on the Habs’ roster, though much of it was absent by years’ end; it was too often forgotten, I think that the roster that played that final game against Toronto was nothing like that which had started 2011-2012, or that which would being the 2012-2013 season.

I had identified two things that might prevent the Habs from repeating their early 2011-2012 success at even-strength: the team had not replaced the loss of two top-6 wingers, and a question mark surrounded Therrien’s ability to coach a strong possession game, based on the 07-08 Penguin’s dismal 46.5% Fenwick Close. I’m very glad that these concerns were wrong. Not only did Bourque resurrect his game, but Gallagher took on the top-6 offensive winger role brilliantly. More impressively, Therrien proved to be capable to preside over an impressive puck possession team, not hesitating to skew his player deployment to best advantadge and emphasizing a style of play that involves lots of carry-ins. As a result, the 2012-2013 Habs have been able to match, and even exceed, the 5-on-5 excellence displayed by the early 2011-2012 Habs.

Montreal’s turnaround in the standings is a pleasant surprise; but when looked at closely, it hardly came out of nowhere.

Fenwick, as a reminder, is a ratio of all goals, shots and misses, for and against; it has been found to correlate very strongly with scoring chances. “Tied” means all five-on-five situation while tied; “Close” adds times when the score is within 1 in the first two periods. PDO is the sum of shooting percentage and save percentage at five-on- five; it has been shown to return close to 1000 over long periods, though exceptional goaltenders can hold their teams’ PDO slightly higher than the 1000 average.

Many of the numbers in this article were retrieved from the invaluable behindthenet.ca resource; others were crunched directly from nhl.com official play-by-play sheets.